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PREFACE 
RESPONSIVE REGULATION IN CONTEXT, CIRCA 2011 
CRISTIE FORD & NATASHA AFFOLDER 
In the fall of 2010, the University of British Columbia Faculty of Law wel-
comed a group of scholars from around the world to consider the state and 
evolution of responsive regulation, in both theory and practice. The occasion 
was the presence of Dr. John Braithwaite, the faculty’s inaugural Fasken Mar-
tineau Senior Visiting Scholar.1 
Given that we are on the cusp of the twentieth anniversary of Ian Ayres 
and John Braithwaite’s seminal book, Responsive Regulation: Transcending 
the Deregulation Debate,2 it is appropriate that this issue begins with John 
Braithwaite’s own reflections on the responsive regulation project. On one 
level, the set of essays that follows his can be read as an attempt to advance 
our understanding of responsive regulation in three substantive areas: tax 
(see the essays of Judith Freedman and Dennis Ventry), financial regulation 
(the contributions of Edward Balleisen, Cristie Ford, Janis Sarra, and Dimity 
Kingsford Smith), and environmental regulation (with essays by Natasha 
Affolder and Oren Perez). But to segregate this body of work into discrete 
areas of substantive subject interest is to miss the provocative cross-currents 
that run between the contributions to this issue. A clear objective of the or-
                                                                    
1  We are grateful to the firm of Fasken Martineau DuMoulin LLP for their generous sup-
port of this multi-year initiative. We are also grateful to the co-sponsors of our symposium 
event: the Workshop and Conference Support Fund, Office of the Vice President Re-
search & International, UBC; the Liu Institute for Global Issues; the HSS Research 
Fund, UBC; and the Conference Fund, UBC Faculty of Law. 
2  (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
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ganizers of this conference was to consciously erode the barriers that prevent 
learning across subject areas, and across disciplines.  
The value of these essays, as a collective, lies in the themes that cut across 
subject areas, in the intellectual doubts that arise from testing responsiveness 
in diverse contexts, and in the cases where responsive regulation both has and 
has not worked. The broad conversations emerging from comparisons be-
tween diverse regulatory contexts continue to renew, enrich, and add nuance 
to theories of responsive regulation today, nearly two decades later. Along 
with reviewing the significance of John Braithwaite’s contribution in this 
issue, this introduction highlights three of these cross-cutting themes in par-
ticular: the civic republican potential (or lack thereof ) inherent in regulatory 
interactions; contemporary nodal, networked, or multi-layered conceptions 
of regulation and governance; and the influence of meta-regulatory or new 
governance notions of ongoing regulatory learning, and their relationship to 
the responsive regulatory pyramid. 
John Braithwaite’s essay in this issue seeks to take stock of the evolution 
of responsive regulation over the past two decades, and to rearticulate a set of 
its fundamental principles. It is a welcome and illuminating exercise. As 
Braithwaite points out, the theory has been layered over—in helpful ways, 
but also in ways that potentially increase its complexity—with an “accumula-
tion of debate, and a thicket of creative implementation and refinement.”3 
Responsive regulation has also produced a number of distinct conceptual 
offspring, all of which share features with Ayres’ and Braithwaite’s original 
conception but which may emphasize different elements, or advance the 
conversation along different lines, and which are sometimes in tension with 
each other. John Braithwaite’s essay in this issue registers these effects. The 
nine core principles of responsive regulation that he identifies are not a re-
turn to some static set of “first principles” circa 1992. There never was such a 
set. From the start, responsive regulation has emphasized the importance of 
praxis and context-specificity in its application.4 Evolution through contex-
                                                                    
3  John Braithwaite, “The Essence of Responsive Regulation” (2011) 44:3 UBC L Rev 475  
at 476 [Braithwaite, “Essence”]. 
4  See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 2 at 99–100. 
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tual application and ongoing scholarly reflection is what had always been 
envisioned for it. 
As is reflected in John Braithwaite’s contribution in this issue, many of 
the core elements of responsive regulation have remained quite stable over 
time. Among these are the emphases on the pyramidal regulatory structure, 
on regulation through engagement and dialogue rather than by dictat, on 
bringing third parties into what had been previously characterized as a binary 
regulator/regulatee interaction, and on the concept of the benign big gun. 
The claims that effective regulatory solutions would transcend what was 
once a bright line divide between public and private spheres, or that regula-
tion should be able to move nimbly between deterrence-oriented and com-
pliance-oriented strategies, are so ubiquitous today that it is almost difficult 
to remember that these were not mainstream arguments in 1992—in the 
days before the Open Method of Coordination in the EU, or the National 
Partnership for Reinventing Government efforts of Al Gore and Bill Clin-
ton. Responsive regulation also has an abiding commitment to a civic repub-
lican notion of justice as non-domination, evolving through practical con-
texts well past neo-republicanism’s theoretical apogee in the 1990s.5 
There have also been some notable evolutions. For one thing, the game 
theory modeling that Ian Ayres brought to the 1992 book has largely faded 
out. Increasingly, in the two decades since this book was published, the re-
sponsive regulation project has been Braithwaite’s, with Ayres’s work moving 
along a separate trajectory. Responsive regulation today is not an attempt to 
transcend an unproductive debate between schools of thought on the press-
ing question of regulation, so much as it is a regulation-oriented instantiation 
of a broader set of commitments that Braithwaite has brought to his work 
across fields ranging from criminology, to tax policy, to peacebuilding. The 
focal shift sheds light on the orientation, the strengths, and perhaps also the 
limits of responsive regulation. Above all, what comes through in this 2011 
                                                                    
5  See e.g. Frank Michelman, “Law’s Republic” (1988) 97:8 Yale LJ 1493; Cass R Sunstein, 
“Beyond the Republican Revival” (1988) 97:8 Yale LJ 1539; Michael Sandel, Democracy’s 
Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1996); Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1997). 
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work is the centrality of the interpersonal relationship, and the need to strive 
toward respectful, legitimate, dialogic regulatory interactions in the pursuit 
of enlightened community building. Ayres and Braithwaite backgrounded 
their broader ideological commitment to republicanism in 1992, noting that 
it was “by no means necessary to accept this position to think that the ideas 
[they] advance may be desirable or practical.”6 Now, it is utterly core to the 
project. Consistent with this, as Braithwaite has described in further detail 
elsewhere,7 the relationship between responsive regulation and one of his 
other signal projects, restorative justice, has been strengthened and deepened. 
Among other things this suggests that the responsive regulatory “big gun” 
may be even more “benign” this time around, with greater efforts being em-
ployed to avoid having to use it and more emphasis on conveying support, 
engagement, and a commitment to fairness and collaborative problem-
solving.  
The contributions in this issue speak to the republican potential in regu-
lation. As Carol Heimer points out, at this stage it is difficult to imagine that 
regulation could still be something that “a regulator unilaterally does to a 
regulatee.”8 At the 2010 workshop, Mary Liston provided a careful account 
of what a precisely republican understanding of non-domination entails, as 
compared to liberal understandings of the same.9 Republicanism entails con-
siderably more. Our shared sense of the thickness of the republican account, 
and its resonance throughout John Braithwaite’s work, helped to tease out 
the implications of the republican approach for each of our subject areas. 
Dennis Ventry’s essay is most explicit here, proposing a front-line reform that 
could transform “the annual rite of taxpaying into a dialogue between citi-
zens and their governments, a civics lesson for taxpayers as well as tax offi-
                                                                    
6  Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 2 at 18. 
7  See John Braithwaite, Restorative Justice and Responsive Regulation (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002). 
8  Carol A Heimer, “Disarticulated Responsiveness: The Theory and Practice of Responsive 
Regulation in Multi-Layered Systems” (2011) 44:3 UBC L Rev 663 at 663. 
9  Working paper on file with authors. 
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cials, and an opportunity to improve the system year after year.”10 He echoes 
the eagerness for relational and dialogic approaches to regulation, and the 
aspirational desire that permeates much of the literature to develop “a par-
ticipatory democracy dimension to . . . the creation and realization of regula-
tion.”11  
Other authors were less sanguine about the emancipatory promise of 
regulation. The scholars that participated in our financial regulation panel, 
in particular, expressed reservations about the skewing effect of power imbal-
ances in dialogic contexts. Responsive regulation is not oblivious to problems 
of power. In fact, it explicitly frames the concept of tripartism as a mecha-
nism for injecting countervailing power against otherwise dominant par-
ties,12 and a way to deter regulatory capture by powerful regulated actors.13 
Where some of the authors in this issue question this argument, it is with 
regard to the feasibility of confronting the effects of power, or even recogniz-
ing them, in real-life regulatory contexts. Janis Sarra points to “power imbal-
ances” as a factor explaining the limited traction of responsive regulation in 
the global context of oversight of structured financial product markets. She 
illuminates the dominant, but also the hidden, voices in financial product 
market regulation. She argues that dialogic and responsive approaches to 
regulation are “vulnerable to hearing only from the regulated”.14 Her work 
points to the need to do more to uncover the many voices that are not heard 
in current regulation, and regulatory scholarship. Cristie Ford argues that 
flexible approaches to regulation are more “porous” to external influence 
than prescriptive regulatory approaches. Her essay pushes regulatory scholars 
to more carefully engage with the vast literature on power, including what 
Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz have framed in terms of agenda-setting 
                                                                    
10  Dennis J Ventry Jr, “Americans Don’t Hate Taxes, They Hate Paying Taxes” (2011) 44:3 
UBC L Rev 835 at 843. 
11  Dimity Kingsford Smith, “A Harder Nut to Crack? Responsive Regulation in the Finan-
cial Services Sector” (2011) 44:3 UBC L Rev 695 at 702. 
12  See Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 2 at 81–86. 
13  See ibid at 71–73. 
14  Janis Sarra, “Risk Management, Responsive Regulation, and Oversight of Structured 
Financial Product Markets” (2011) 44:3 UBC L Rev 779 at 781. 
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power.15 In that vein, but assessing the power of regulators as opposed to 
regulatees, Dimity Kingsford Smith argues that it is “lack of power” on the 
part of the Australian Securities and Investments Commission which in part 
explains the limits of responsive regulation in the financial services sector. 
Responsive regulation has also been influenced by the development of 
networked, or nodal, approaches to governance.16 Nodal governance builds 
on potential that has always been inherent in responsive regulation. From the 
beginning, responsive regulation envisioned a regulator-regulated relation-
ship that was supported and augmented through tripartism and the involve-
ment of a broader community of interests.17 Since 1992, the work has been 
substantially fleshed out through scholarly learning about networks and 
nodes,18 and about the relationship between regulation and other elements—
social, economic—of the “license to operate”.19 Responsive regulation circa 
2011 envisions regulators that work consciously within a web of other legal 
and beyond-legal relationships, drawing on those resources when escalating 
up the pyramid of sanctions.20 The works in this issue demonstrate how far 
responsive regulation has come in the direction of nodal and network gov-
ernance. The kinds of interventions being made by these authors were not 
possible in 1992, before we had a more granular understanding of the full 
range of actors contributing to governance. 
Specifically, situating responsive regulation within detailed, messy, and 
dynamic accounts of regulatory activities demands, for a number of contribu-
tors to this issue, better accounts of the dynamic, multi-layered interactions of 
regulatory actors. Carol Heimer explicitly tackles the question of what the 
multiplicity and complexity of regulatory actors implies for the theory and 
                                                                    
15  Peter Bachrach & Morton S Baratz, “Two Faces of Power” (1962) 56:4 Am Pol Sci Rev 
947. 
16  See Peter Drahos, “Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal Govern-
ance Approach” (2004) 77:2 Temp L Rev 401. 
17  See especially Ayres & Braithwaite, supra note 2 at 54–100. 
18  See especially Drahos, supra note 16. 
19  See Neil Gunningham, Robert A Kagan & Dorothy Thornton, Shades of Green: Business, 
Regulation, and Environment (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
20  See Braithwaite, “Essence”, supra note 3. 
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practice of responsive regulation by focusing on regulatory actors (and not 
just actions). She identifies the assumption at the core of responsive regula-
tory theory of a “a closely articulated system in which regulators at each level 
of the system fine-tune their actions to induce regulatee cooperation”.21 Her 
work, along with a number of other contributions to this issue, challenges 
this assumption. Natasha Affolder’s essay on large infrastructure and natural 
resource projects cautions against an assumption of “networks” where multi-
ple regulators are engaged in a common project. A close look at the empirical 
realities of large project regulation suggests that a model that posits a gov-
ernment regulator “harnessing” or mobilizing non-state actors such as local 
and transnational NGOs may overstate the degree of cooperation between 
these actors. Dimity Kingsford Smith questions whether a nodal or network-
ing model of pragmatic responsiveness that encourages strategic intervention 
where a regulatory initiative might work ill fits the formality of a pyramidal 
approach to responsive regulation. 
During the 2010 workshop, Susan Sturm presented a powerful visual im-
age of the “regulatory constellation” which well captures not only the multi-
plicity of regulatory actors, but the fact that each is a moving target. The 
contributions to this issue are attentive not only to the interactions between 
regulatory actors but the changing relationships between these actors. Judith 
Freedman, in the tax context, draws attention to the shifting relationships 
between revenue authorities and business, providing the example of the work 
of Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs in the United Kingdom. Janis Sarra 
illustrates the complex and constantly moving global architecture of state and 
non-state regulation of structured financial product markets.  
The third cross-cutting theme that we pull out here, which has had a sub-
stantial effect on responsive regulation circa 2011, has been the influence of 
recent work conducted under the aegises of meta-regulation and new gov-
ernance.22 One of the key elements of meta-regulation and new govern-
                                                                    
21  Heimer, supra note 8 at 665. 
22  See e.g. Charles F Sabel & Jonathan Zeitlin, “Learning from Difference: The New Archi-
tecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU” (2008) 14:3 Eur LJ 271; Christine 
Parker, The Open Corporation: Effective Self-Regulation and Democracy (New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2002); Malcolm K Sparrow, The Regulatory Craft: Controlling 
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ance—which John Braithwaite’s essay in this issue both embraces, with cave-
ats, and then provocatively advances through a proposal for randomized con-
trolled trials of justice interventions23—is the emphasis on embedding learn-
ing paradigms and building systematic learning processes into regulatory ar-
chitecture. The move opens the possibility that incremental tit-for-tat regu-
latory interactions can be aggregated into context-specific, bottom-up learn-
ing, which can feed back into continual improvements to the regulatory ap-
proach. Significantly, meta-regulation and new governance envision learning 
both at the regulatory level, and at the regulatee level, and an energetic feed-
back loop between them.  
One of the ways in which responsive regulation circa 2011 is consistent 
with the multiple-degrees-of-learning mandate is in the development of a 
more nuanced set of regulatory pyramids. The two original regulatory and 
enforcement pyramids have been reconceived and recast into a pyramid of 
supports, and a pyramid of sanctions.24 Regulators move sequentially all the 
way through the pyramid of supports and then over to the pyramid of sanc-
tions. The pyramid of supports is designed to support and enlarge the mana-
gerial capacities of regulated actors by way of education and persuasion, 
praise, prizes, and grants. The pyramid of sanctions also locates education 
and persuasion at its base, but then ratchets up through an alternative set of 
mechanisms: shaming, regulatory and criminal sanctions, and finally deli-
censing. Interestingly, the pyramid of supports in particular bears a strong 
resemblance to the notions of “benchmarking”, or “rolling best-practices 
rulemaking” that have been developed by experimentalist scholars.25 The 
concept here is that the pyramid of supports can “[pull] the performance of 
the most innovative actors up through new ceilings” and simultaneously 
“make it easier to increase demands upon laggards.”26 Whenever one regu-
                                                                                                                                               
Risks, Solving Problems, and Managing Compliance (Washington, DC: Brookings Institu-
tion Press, 2000). 
23  See Braithwaite, “Essence”, supra note 3 at 512. 
24  Ibid at 482, figure 1. 
25  See especially Michael C Dorf & Charles F Sabel, “A Constitution of Democratic Ex-
perimentalism” (1998) 98:2 Colum L Rev 267 at 350–56. 
26  Braithwaite, “Essence”, supra note 3 at 481. 
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lated actor breaks through an old ceiling, regulators convey to others in the 
same industry that they are expected also to reach that ceiling, either by pur-
chasing a leading actor’s technology (providing that actor with a potential 
source of profit) or by inventing their own. Regulatory standards actually 
“roll”, in that they are keyed to leaders’ productive innovations rather than to 
static industry practices, or the lowest common denominator.27 
The authors in this issue engage with the notion of learning-by-doing by 
trying to excavate what actually happens within street-level regulation. Doing 
so highlights the complexity, the contingency, and the challenge associated 
with both implementing responsive regulation well on the front lines, and 
building in the learning systems and habits needed to scale those experienced 
up to a regulatory system level. In this regard, some of the essays in this issue 
are more cautious about the feasibility of responsive regulation than is John 
Braithwaite himself. Some authors might take at least some issue with his 
claim that responsive regulation can be equated with another challenging 
task that we leave to “people of ordinary talents”: parenting.28  
A number of authors identify a preference in the literature for a focus on 
criminal and civil penalties, responsive regulation’s “benign big guns”. Dimity 
Kingsford Smith, writing on the Australian financial services sector, thus 
calls for renewed attention to regulation “lower down” the regulatory pyra-
mid. The preference for too-much-too-late punitive responses may suggest a 
broader epistemological problem encountered at the front line, where regula-
tors must be able to see patterns that sometimes are only completely clear in 
hindsight, and must read past “noise” events to discern underlying causes. 
Oren Perez also underlines the “demanding epistemic requirements” involved 
in implementing responsive regulation in concrete cases. As Judith Freedman 
uncovers, substantial street-level compliance challenges are inherent in a con-
text (tax regulation) where there is a lack of consensus on what it means to be 
“non-compliant”. Cristie Ford also describes the “micro level” incremental 
evolutions in regulatee practice, such as those around the automation of risk 
                                                                    
27  On potential rule of law challenges produced by rolling best-practices rulemaking, see 
Cristie L Ford, “New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities Regula-
tion” (2008) 45:1 Am Bus LJ 1 at 41–45. 
28  Braithwaite, “Essence”, supra note 3 at 518. 
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and compliance processes in financial firms, which may fly under the regula-
tory radar even though cumulatively they amount to very significant shifts. 
Similarly, Carol Heimer illuminates the pragmatic considerations that ex-
plain the disconnect between the awareness of street-level regulators that 
there need to be timely regulatory responses and the lags that inevitably oc-
cur: staff shortages, staff dependencies on people working at other levels of 
the regulatory system, garden-variety corruption. Pointing to these and other 
factors, she concludes that at the street level, “responsiveness is just barely 
possible, at least some of the time.”29  
DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This issue captures a moment in the still-vibrant and continuously evolving 
scholarship on responsive regulation. It reminds us, potently through Ed-
ward Balleisen’s outline of avenues for historical inquiry into the global fi-
nancial crisis, and through Cristie Ford’s valuable dissection of the subsets of 
scholarly work that responsive regulatory theory has spawned, that there is a 
need to study and explain what has come before, and to build on existing 
literature. 
But for many contributors, this is also the moment to ask: what do we not 
know about responsive regulation? What areas appear immune to responsive 
regulatory experimentation? What can we learn from the failures of respon-
sive regulatory approaches? What scholarly directions and what methods for 
new research are needed in the years ahead? What are the hidden assump-
tions and unacknowledged blind spots in the literature? These are the sorts 
of questions Oren Perez encourages regulatory scholars to engage with by 
adopting a second-order reflexivity that would reveal “the presuppositions 
and commitments that are shared by those who engage in the debate.”30 Ed-
ward Balleisen takes some useful steps forward here, exploring the shared 
ideologies underlying dominant modes of thought, including the “continual 
                                                                    
29  Heimer, supra note 8 at 689. 
30  Oren Perez, “Responsive Regulation and Second-Order Reflexivity: On the Limits of 
Regulatory Intervention” (2011) 44:3 UBC L Rev 743 at 760. 
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emphasis on homo economicus Chicagus”.31 He stresses the need for ethno-
graphic studies to uncover the history of institutions, financial products, and 
sets of ideas. He pushes scholars to begin the task of “investigating the poten-
tial links between the conceptual frameworks at the core of conservative 
economics and the sort of policy defaults that operated within regulatory 
agencies, or for that matter, the risk-management structures within financial 
firms.”32  
At the methodological level, the time is ripe to increase the degree of clar-
ity around the precise players and mechanisms with which we are concerned. 
Who has agency in our accounts, and what are the implications of focusing 
on a particular layer within a multi-layered regulatory structure? What can 
we say about how real life mechanisms function—the precise ways in which 
regulators move up and down the regulatory pyramid, the obstacles to inter-
regulatory coordinated action, the quality of information being gathered? 
Are there feasibility limits imposed on responsive regulation, and can we 
think of strategies for husbanding regulatory energy and channeling the dia-
logic project toward high priority areas? 
This much we can say with conviction: learning by doing requires con-
tinued close attention to context and cross-cutting themes, precisely along 
the lines of this issue. This is explicit in Natasha Affolder’s essay.33 It docu-
ments the prevalence of case studies on large project regulation, but the ab-
sence of any synthesis of these case studies. She advances three avenues for 
descriptively thick new research on environmental regulation (regulation 
through contracts, monitoring agencies, and international standards) that 
can cut across existing case studies and deepen existing accounts of large pro-
ject regulation. And so the responsive regulatory project continues. 
                                                                    
31  Edward Balleisen, “The Global Financial Crisis and Responsive Regulation: Some Ave-
nues for Historical Inquiry” (2011) 44:3 UBC L Rev 557 at 584. 
32  Ibid. 
33  “Why Study Large Projects? Environmental Regulation’s Neglected Frontier” (2011) 
44:3 UBC L Rev 521. 
